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 Honorable A. Wallace Tashima, Senior Judge of the*
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by
designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
No. 06-1083
            
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
   v.
LEONARD PAULK,
A/K/A “Pooh”
         Leonard Paulk,
                             Appellant
          
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 03-cr-00228-2)
District Judge: Honorable Freda Wolfson
         
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 30, 2008
Before: SLOVITER, STAPLETON, and TASHIMA,  Circuit Judges*
(Filed: November 5, 2008)
         
OPINION
         
2SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Leonard Paulk was convicted, following a jury trial, of one count of conspiracy to
distribute narcotics, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (count 1), and one count of
distribution of crack cocaine, or cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and 18
U.S.C. § 2 (count 3).  On appeal, Paulk argues that there was insufficient evidence to
support his conviction on count 3.  Paulk also argues that the District Court’s jury
instructions on aiding and abetting were erroneous; that the District Court improperly
admitted certain evidence; and that the District Court erred in its conclusion that a life
sentence was mandatory under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b).  We will affirm.      
I.
Underlying this appeal is a long history of widespread drug dealing on the streets
of Camden, New Jersey.  Because we write primarily for the parties, we do not review the
facts in detail.  In sum, the government charged, and the jury convicted, Paulk of
conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine as well as aiding and abetting a specific crack
cocaine transaction.  After his conviction, the District Court denied Paulk’s motion for a
judgment of acquittal.  The Court found that the record contained “overwhelming
evidence,” App. at 18, of Paulk’s participation in the drug conspiracy charged in the
indictment, and we see no reason to disturb that conclusion.  The District Court also
found that there was sufficient evidence to show that Paulk was a culpable participant in
the specific transaction underlying count 3.  Paulk was sentenced to two concurrent terms
3of life imprisonment and required to pay a $15,000 fine and $200 special assessment.  
We turn to Paulk’s principal contention on appeal regarding the insufficiency of
evidence on count 3.  The essence of the government’s case on count 3 was that Paulk
aided and abetted a transaction in which Jose Perez (a cooperating witness) purchased
four and one-half ounces of crack cocaine from Darnell Tuten on March 26, 2002.  Paulk
had long relationships of drug dealing with both Tuten and Perez, and it was Perez’s
evidence that formed the basis of the government’s case against Paulk on count 3.
Paulk concedes that the jury could have believed that Paulk referred Perez to Tuten
as a potential contact for drugs and vouched for Tuten’s integrity and reliability to Perez. 
Appellant’s Br. at 26.  Perez had a conversation with Paulk which Perez testified meant
that Paulk “wants me to hook up with [Tuten], and set it up, and he’s telling me the guy is
good.”  Supp. App. at 135.  In light of the record, we reject Paulk’s contention that the
District Court clearly erred in reading that sentence to suggest that Paulk in fact set it up
for Perez to deal with Tuten. 
It was up to the jury to decide whether Paulk aided and abetted the subsequent
transaction on March 26, 2002.  The jury’s determination could well have been confirmed
by the conversation three days later in which Perez informed Paulk that he had purchased
drugs from Tuten, after which Paulk assured Perez that Tuten was “good  people” and
that Paulk would not recommend anyone to Perez “that’s not right.”  App. at 175.2. 
Moreover, the jury heard Perez’s testimony that Paulk was “trying to hook us up.  I didn’t
4want to mess with [Tuten], but [Paulk’s] trying to set us up,” App. at 161, and that Paulk
was the “one who set the whole thing up.” App. at 209.  Indeed, Perez testified that Tuten
told him that Paulk had “talked to [Tuten] about me, and that we should hook up,” App. at
175, and that before this, Tuten “wouldn’t even speak to me.” App. at 209.  Finally, even
excluding evidence related to cocaine and heroin transactions implicitly rejected by the
jury’s special verdict on count 1, the jury heard sufficient evidence to conclude that Tuten
and Paulk had an on-going drug dealing relationship such that Paulk could reasonably
expect to benefit from facilitating the Perez-Tuten transaction.  Cf. United States v.
Frorup, 963 F.2d 41, 43-44 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[T]he jury had evidence to find that Frorup
abetted Williams’s possession by procuring the customers and maintaining the market in
which the possession is profitable . . . .”) (quotation omitted).  In sum, there was
sufficient evidence for a rational jury to conclude that Paulk had attempted to facilitate
the subsequent Perez-Tuten drug transaction.
Similarly, we also reject Paulk’s remaining arguments.  As to Paulk’s contention
that the District Court’s jury instructions on aiding and abetting were erroneous, given
that Paulk failed to object at trial, we review the instructions only for plain error.  Reading
them as a whole, we cannot say that the District Court’s instructions were plainly
erroneous because the District Court correctly recited the black letter elements of aiding
and abetting liability and advised the jury that Paulk could not be deemed guilty of aiding
and abetting solely by vouching for Tuten to Perez, but rather that the government had to
5prove something more, such as an on-going personal or financial relationship between
Paulk and Tuten.  Next, we cannot agree with Paulk’s contention that the District Court
erred by admitting evidence that a trained drug-sniffing dog reacted positively to money
contained in Paulk’s minivan.  The District Court found that the government
demonstrated that the dog and his handler were well-trained in the field, had successfully
completed drug searches in the past, and that the evidence would be helpful to the jury as
circumstantial evidence that the money resulted from unlawful activity. Moreover, the
District Court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Paulk’s expert testimony of the
unreliability of such dog sniffing evidence in light of the manifest shortcomings of that
testimony.  Finally, we reject Paulk’s challenge to his sentence because the District Court
properly concluded that it was not free to disregard the statutory minimum sentence
imposed by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b).  United States v. Kellum, 356 F.3d 285, 289 (3d Cir.
2004).  
II.
For the above-stated reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and
sentence.
